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Abstract 
This paper describes the degree of perceived autonomy and control in Norwegian state 
agencies, examines the relationships between different dimensions of autonomy, and 
analyzes the variations in perceived autonomy and control. One of the main findings of 
a broad survey of Norwegian state agencies carried out in 2004 is that agencies have 
quite a lot of autonomy. However, this autonomy is not of a general nature but varies 
significantly along different dimensions. Some autonomy dimensions represent clusters 
that supplement one other, while others are rather loosely coupled. The formulated 
hypotheses based on selected variables derived from a structural-instrumental, a 
cultural-institutional, and an environmental approach generally did not get strong 
support from the empirical analyses. There are, however, some significant relationships 
with variables derived from all three perspectives.  
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Sammendrag 
Dette notatet beskriver opplevd autonomi og kontroll i norske statlige 
forvaltningsorgan. Det fokuseres spesielt på relasjonene mellom ulike dimensjoner ved 
autonomi, slik som personalmessig autonomi, finansiell autonomi og policy-autonomi 
og på variasjoner i autonomi og kontroll slik det oppleves fra de ulike forvaltnings-
organene. Det empiriske grunnlaget er en bredt anlagt spørreundersøkelse til statlige 
forvaltingsorgan utenom departementene som ble gjennomført i 2004. Et hovedfunn er 
at forvaltningsorganene opplever en betydelig autonomi. Men denne autonomien 
varierer langs ulike dimensjoner og er for eksempel større i personalsaker enn i 
finansielle spørsmål. Noen autonomidimensjoner utgjør sammenhengende knippe mens 
andre er mer løst koplet. De formulerte hypotesene på grunnlag av et strukturelt-
instrumentelt perpektiv, et kulturelt-institusjonelt perspektiv og et omgivelsesperspektiv 
får generelt ikke sterk støtte i de empiriske analysene. Det er imidlertid signifikante 
sammenhenger med variabler fra alle tre perspektivene. 
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Introduction 
Agencies represent a traditional organizational form in the Norwegian central 
government with a long history. They are an integral part of the Norwegian civil service, 
and norms and practices for agency autonomy and control have become established 
over time. In the last decade, however, agencies have been subjected to reorganizations 
and reforms. As in many other countries, there has been a general trend in Norway to 
upgrade the role of agencies by giving them increased autonomy and by introducing 
role-purification. This development has been especially strong for regulatory agencies. 
The Norwegian government recently formulated a new regulatory policy focusing on 
the autonomization and strengthening of supervisory agencies. In addition, efforts to 
increase agency autonomy have been accompanied by an increase in external auditing 
and control. This dual prescription of both enhanced autonomy and more control 
produces an inherent tension in agency reforms. On the one hand, the agencies are 
supposed to gain more autonomy, both from political executives and from market 
actors. On the other hand, central political control is expected to be enhanced by a 
strengthening of frame steering and regulatory power (Christensen and Lægreid 2004a).  
Generally there is a strong belief among reform agents that formal structure will 
make a difference, and reorganization is thus a main strategy in agency reform. There is 
a large literature on how formal structure affects behavior (Egeberg 2003), but still the 
implications of formal structure are often not always very well understood (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2004). In this paper we will challenge the one-sided focus on formal agency 
structure and look at cultural and environmental features as well in order to understand 
how autonomy and control are perceived in different forms of agencies. 
This paper sets out to do two things: 1) to describe the degree of perceived 
autonomy and control in Norwegian state agencies and to examine the relationships 
between different dimensions of autonomy; 2) to analyze the variation in perceived 
autonomy and control, emphasizing the importance of the structural, cultural, and 
environmental features of the agencies. The empirical basis is a broad survey of 
Norwegian state agencies carried out in 2004. 
State agencies are part of the civil service, but they are structurally disaggregated from 
the ministries. They carry out public tasks on a permanent basis, are staffed by civil 
servants, are subject to public law procedures, and are normally financed mainly by the 
state budget. They have some autonomy from the ministries in policy decision-making 
and in personnel, financial, and managerial matters, but they are not totally independent 
(Pollitt et al. 2004). 
The main set of dependent variables in this paper is different dimensions of 
autonomy and control. Agency autonomy is a multidimensional concept and not linked 
to agencies’ formal legal status in any straightforward way. Agencies with the same 
formal status may vary substantially in their autonomy (Pollitt et al. 2004), and 
autonomy may apply to varying degrees to a number of different dimensions, such as 
policy autonomy, managerial autonomy, and structural, financial, and legal autonomy 
(Christensen 2001, Verhoest et al. 2004). One may also differentiate between strategic 
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autonomy and operational autonomy along some of these dimensions (Verhoest et al. 
2004). Autonomy along one dimension may not imply autonomy along others 
(Bouckaert and Peters 2004). The level of autonomy may also vary over time. There are 
differences between structural autonomy, legal autonomy, and de facto autonomy. 
Structural disaggregation and autonomy in practice often go together, but there may also 
be agencies which score high on disaggregation and low on autonomy (Graham and 
Roberts 2004), and vice versa. Agency autonomy must also be seen in relation to control 
from superior bodies. The agencies are not independent in any absolute sense, but are 
quasi-autonomous entities and the ministries will normally use different forms for 
control and steering to constrain the agencies’ autonomy.  
In this paper we will first present the Norwegian context of agencification and 
administrative reform. Second, we will outline three theoretical perspectives, focusing 
on different explanatory variables, and formulate hypotheses on the relationships 
between these independent variables and perceived autonomy and control. Third, we 
will briefly describe the data base and methodology. Fourth, we will present the 
empirical results. Finally, we will discuss the findings and draw conclusions. 
The context 
Norway is a small unitary, parliamentary, and multiparty state. Since the early 1970s, it 
has mainly been ruled by minority governments, and since 1994 it has been connected 
to the EU through the Economic Area Agreement. In a comparative perspective, it has 
a strong democratic tradition, scores high on per capita income and abundance of 
natural resources, has relatively strong collectivistic and egalitarian values, is consensus-
oriented, and has a low level of internal conflict and well-developed corporatist arrange-
ments. It also has one of the most comprehensive and universal welfare states in the 
world with a large public sector. Its economy is open and dependent on export. The 
relationships between parliament, ministers, and agencies are based on the principle of 
ministerial responsibility, meaning that the minister is responsible to the parliament for 
all activities within his or her policy area in the ministry as well as in subordinate bodies. 
Political control over the civil service has, however, been general and passive, allowing 
the executive a lot of leeway. This seems to reflect some major features of the political-
administrative system: high levels of mutual trust and shared attitudes and norms among 
political and administrative leaders and within the public sector (Christensen and 
Lægreid 2005a). The level of trust in public institutions is generally higher than in most 
other countries (Norris 1999). Surveys of political support for national government and 
parliament nearly always accord Norway a leading position. Nevertheless, the pattern of 
confidence in political institutions is cyclical, and the level was lower at the end of the 
1990s than in the early 1980s (Listhaug 1995, 1998).  
Agencies have been a major organizational form in the Norwegian central 
government for a long time and have displayed a lot of path-dependency, representing 
an enduring historical conflict between the political executive and professional groups 
(Christensen and Roness 1999). Around 1850 the first autonomous professional 
agencies (called directorates) outside the integrated and jurist-dominated hierarchical 
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ministries were established, primarily in the communications sector. A second wave of 
independent agencies followed in the 1870s. This agency type was imitated from 
Sweden. In the period between the establishment of the parliamentary principle in 1884 
and the outbreak of World War I the number of new independent agencies stagnated, 
and in the period between the world wars a partially integrated agency model became 
more widespread. 
In the mid-1950s the government stated a new principle for agency structure and 
increased the number of independent agencies. The idea was that more technical issues 
and routine tasks should be moved to the agencies, while policy and planning tasks 
should stay within the ministries. The new doctrine resulted in the establishment of 
several new agencies over the next 15 years, but this development slowed down in the 
1970s, partly for political reasons (Christensen and Roness 1999, Grønlie 2001).  
The dominant agency model in Norway has historically been rather unified, with little 
horizontal specialization (Christensen and Lægreid 2004b). In most agencies 
administrative tasks, regulatory and control tasks, and service provision and production 
tasks have been combined and integrated. Traditionally, Norway has not had any type of 
administrative court. Appeals are directed to the parent ministry, which can also instruct 
the agencies. The idea that there ought to be separate agencies for different tasks is 
rather new, although some of the agencies have enjoyed enhanced authority for some 
time, mainly in financial and personnel matters, but also in some more substantive areas 
(Lægreid et al. 2003). 
Over the past 15 years, a process of structural devolution has been going on in the 
Norwegian central government, and the independent agency model has become more 
differentiated (Christensen and Lægreid 2003). This development was partly inspired by 
New Public Management ideas and solutions, but was also a part of Norway’s 
adaptation to the EU and the internal market. The model combines vertical inter-
organizational specialization (or structural disaggregation), whereby agencies formally 
gain more authority, with increased horizontal inter-organizational specialization, 
whereby the distribution of roles and tasks among agencies are more differentiated and 
non-overlapping.  
Until the late 1980s major public sectors like railways, telecommunications, electrical 
power, postal services, forestry, grain sales, airports, road construction, and public 
broadcasting were organized as integrated government services, whereby the state held 
the roles of owner, provider, purchaser, regulator, and controller. Since then, the 
commercial parts of these enterprises have become corporatized, while the regulatory 
parts have been streamlined into separate agencies, creating a more fragmented and 
disintegrated model. Over time, the primary task of an increasing proportion of agencies 
has become regulation and scrutiny (Rubecksen 2004). Some of these agencies, like the 
Data Inspectorate, the Lottery Inspectorate, and the Media Authority, are new, but 
many also represent re-labelling and rearrangements of former activities and 
organizations.  
Since the mid-1990s NPM has gained a stronger footing in Norway, and reforms 
have become increasingly comprehensive and radical in recent years (Christensen and 
Lægreid 2001, 2002). The introduction of Management by Objectives and Results, 
private sector management tools, changes from horizontally integrated ministerial 
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models to single-purpose models, increased agencification, and the establishment of 
autonomous regulatory bodies have been the result. There has also been a strong trend 
in some policy areas to merge smaller bodies into larger units. One example of this is 
the reform of higher education in the mid-1990s, in which many relatively small state 
colleges were merged, reducing the number from 98 to 26 (Lægreid et al. 2003). 
In 2003 the current conservative-centre minority government put forward a White 
Paper to the parliament (St.meld nr. 17 (2002–2003)), proposing a new regulatory policy, 
whereby regulatory agencies would increase their independence from the ministries. 
Political considerations were to be confined primarily to setting general norms through 
laws and rules, while executive politicians were expected to leave individual cases to be 
handled by competent professionals in the regulatory agencies. The regulatory agencies 
were to be endowed with legitimacy by removing the ambiguity inherent in mixing 
political and professional considerations, by making the balance between these 
considerations more explicit, and by strengthening their professional competence. The 
opportunities for ministers to instruct the agencies in the handling of individual cases 
should be reduced by directing ministerial responsibility more toward broader policy 
questions and general guidelines. In addition, it was proposed to change the complaints 
procedure in several agencies by moving it away from the ministries and into new 
independent bodies of appeal. The parliament did not approve all of these proposals, 
and a compromise was reached with some of the opposition parties in which the 
establishment of independent appeal boards was postponed until after the next general 
election. It was also agreed that the restriction in the power of executive political leaders 
to instruct the agencies should not be introduced as a general principle but should be 
handled on a case-by-case basis (Christensen and Lægreid 2004b).  
Summing up, the independent agency model is an old and contested organizational 
form in the Norwegian central government. One of the most enduring conflicts in 
Norwegian administrative policy has revolved around the issues of agency autonomy 
and ministerial control. There seems to be no final answer or best solution to the 
question of how to balance autonomy and control, and one lesson from the past is that 
one has to learn to live with a certain amount of tension between these two 
considerations and with the unstable trade-offs that occur both over time and across 
different administrative cultures and structural arrangements. 
Theoretical approaches 
We will distinguish between three perspectives on organizations: a structural-
instrumental approach, a cultural-institutional approach, and an environmental 
approach, which stresses the importance of external pressure. The first perspective 
emphasizes the formal organizational structure, and we would thus expect to find a 
close link between formal structure and how autonomy and control are perceived and 
practised. For example, the regulatory agencies may differ from civil service 
organizations performing other tasks and with different forms of affiliation. By contrast, 
the institutional perspective would attribute variations in how autonomy and control are 
perceived and practised to other organizational features, such as age, size, and culture. 
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The external pressure, emphasized by the environmental approach, is primarily related 
to market pressure and competition, and may, as shown below, share some common 
ground with the instrumental perspective. We will now present these perspectives in 
some detail and derive some hypotheses from them. 
A structura l - instrumental  perspect ive  
A main feature of many organizational approaches is the concept of bounded rationality 
(March and Simon 1958), which implies that decision-makers have limited time and 
attention and cannot address all goals, all alternatives, and all consequences. They face 
problems of capacity and understanding and have to make some selections. The formal 
organizational structure represents one important selection mechanism. Formal 
structures and procedures organize some actors, cleavages, problems, and solutions into 
decision-making processes in the public sector, while others are excluded.  
Gulick (1937) argues that there is a rather close connection between the formal 
structure chosen and the practice within and between organizations, underlining that the 
way formal authority is distributed among hierarchical levels is important for autonomy 
in practice. In a system characterized by independent agencies this distribution is biased 
against the political executive and we will thus generally expect to find rather high level 
of autonomy in the agencies. The formal instruments of steering are diluted, the 
distance between administrative levels increases, and political signals are generally 
weaker in independent bodies (Egeberg 2003). Whether agencies are specialized 
according to process, purpose, clientele, or geography will also affect their behavior. 
Decision-makers act on behalf of formal organizations. A structural-instrumental 
approach presumes that one has to study how the public sector is organized in order to 
understand how it works. It makes a difference whether central government is an 
integrated system under ministerial responsibility or a disintegrated system of 
autonomous or semi-autonomous organizations, whether it is centralized or de-
centralized, and whether it is specialized according to the principle of geography and/or 
other principles (Christensen and Lægreid 2005c).  
According to this perspective formal structure matters, but it is not the only 
organizational feature that may be instrumentally designed. It is not enough to focus on 
the narrow internal organizational structure of the agencies, for the division of tasks as 
well as their external organization may play an important role in their behavior. Thus, 
explanatory factors include formal structural features both within and between public 
organizations as well as polity features (Christensen and Lægreid 2003, Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2004).  
Based on this general perspective we will adopt three structural variables: form of 
affiliation, type of agency, and primary tasks.1 Form of affiliation represents the external 
organization, or form and degree of structural disaggregation from the parent ministry. 
Our main distinction will be between ordinary agencies and agencies with various forms 
and degrees of formal autonomy. Our general hypothesis (H1) will be that the most 
                                                 
1 For a description of the independent variables, see the Appendix. 
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structurally disaggregated organizations will perceive themselves as having more 
autonomy and less control than agencies that are structurally closer to the ministry. 
The term type of agency refers to the internal organization of the agencies. Based on 
Gulick’s principles of specialization we will distinguish between: 1) agencies organized 
on the principle of purpose, process, or clientele at the national level without any 
regional or local branches; 2) agencies in which the main principle for organization is 
geography (area), with one agency in each region or district but without a central agency 
between the local bodies and the ministry; and 3) organizations with purpose, process, 
or clientele as the main principle of organization at the national level, but with sub-
organizations (branches) in various territorial areas. We will expect the existence of a 
geographical component in agency specialization in addition to specialization according 
to ministerial sectors will tend to increase the autonomy of subordinate bodies. Agencies 
organized according to geography will be more embedded in regional or local networks, 
which will tend to increase their autonomy from their parent ministry. In Norway, most 
ministries are organized according to purpose, a few have elements of process or 
clientele, while none are specialized according to geography at the ministerial level. 
Thus, our hypothesis (H2) will be that agencies organized according to geography in 
combination with another principle will perceive themselves as having more autonomy 
and less control than agencies without a territorial component. External and internal 
organization may also supplement each other. Agencies scoring high on disaggregation 
that are also specialized according to geography may thus have greater autonomy than 
agencies which score low on disaggregation and are specialized according to purpose. 
The third structural variable is the character of primary tasks. Studies of state agencies 
reveal that there are significant variations in their behavior according to what their 
primary tasks are (Pollitt et al. 2004). Not only the degree of vertical specialization and 
type of horizontal specialization but also the task structure is of importance when it 
comes to how autonomy is exercised in practice. Here, the basis of categorization is 
their own perception of what kind of tasks they have. We will distinguish between 
regulatory tasks, service providing or producing tasks, and policy-formulation or other 
ways of exercising public authority. According to the regulatory and administrative 
policy doctrines of today, regulatory agencies should be at arm’s length from ministries 
in order to enhance credibility and reduce political uncertainty, and political executives 
should not interfere in the activities of service providing and producing agencies, 
because this could disturb free and fair market competition. Thus, the hypothesis (H3) 
is that agencies with regulatory tasks or service providing or producing tasks generally 
will have more autonomy than agencies with other primary tasks.  
A cul tura l - inst i tut ional  perspect ive  
A second set of factors concern the historical and cultural traditions of political-
administrative systems (Selznick 1957). In institutional approaches informal norms, 
identities, and the logic of appropriateness are more important than interests and 
intentions and the logic of consequentiality (March and Olsen 1989). The point of 
departure is that a certain style of controlling agencies has developed over time. Norms 
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and values within agencies and central government and internal dynamics are important. 
Path dependencies constrain what is appropriate and possible to move to agency status 
and how the agencies will operate. The reform road taken reflects the main features of 
national institutional processes, where institutional «roots» determine the path followed 
(Krasner 1988). Change is characterized by historical inefficiency and incrementalism. 
What happens in one agency is not a blueprint for developments in other agencies. 
Regulatory reforms reinforce underlying distinctive agency-specific or sector-specific 
trajectories and historical legacies, and the effects of formal structure are mediated and 
constrained by contextual factors (Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002). Administrative 
traditions represent ‘filters’ producing different outcomes in different sectors, and 
agencies. 
Certain styles of controlling agencies have developed over the years, whereby 
agencies are seen as strong and integrated instruments of political development serving 
particular political goals. For a long time this was a dominant feature of the Norwegian 
administrative model (Grønlie 1999). Over the past years, however, this model has been 
challenged, and the culture has changed toward giving agencies more leeway and 
autonomy and allowing for looser coupling to political goals, and it has gradually come 
to be taken for granted that agencies should be at arm’s length from the political 
executive. The extent of this cultural change will probably vary between policy areas, 
tasks, and agencies. In some administrative cultures well-established informal contacts 
and networks between ministries and agencies may undermine their autonomy and 
create stronger integration between ministry and agency than expected from the formal 
model (Jacobsson 1984, Pierre 2004). 
We will distinguish between four indicators of administrative culture. First, agency age. 
Normally, the development of a distinct culture and tradition takes some time. Older 
organizations will tend to have developed a stronger identity than younger ones, and the 
potential for socialization of their members into a common culture is higher. Thus, we 
will expect (H4) that older agencies will perceive themselves as having more autonomy 
and less control than younger agencies.  
Second, agency size. Small agencies may generally have a more homogeneous culture 
and a more distinct identity than large agencies, and are thus more able to modify signals 
coming from the ministry. At the same time, they may have less administrative capability 
to exploit and utilize the possibilities offered by disaggregation and formal autonomy. 
Thus, assuming the primacy of homogeneous identity one may expect (H5a) small 
agencies generally perceive themselves as having more autonomy and less control than 
large agencies. If, on the other hand, we assume primacy of capacity we may expect 
(H5b) large agencies in practice to perceive themselves as having more autonomy and 
less control than small agencies. 
Third, we argue that mutual trust also makes a difference. If there is a high level of 
mutual trust between an agency and the parent ministry there will be no cultural 
collusion between them, and thus no particular need for comprehensive steering and 
control from the top. Our hypothesis (H6) will then be that a high level of mutual trust 
between the agency and parent ministry will enhance agency autonomy. The effects of 
large autonomy in a high trust system will, however, be smaller because of shared 
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identities, high level of socialization, and similarities in problem definintions and 
solutions at the different administrative levels. 
Fourth, we will expect internal agency culture to affect the degree of autonomy and 
control. Agencies with a strong professional culture underlining expertise and 
professional quality will generally perceive themselves as having more autonomy and 
less control than other agencies (H7a). In particular, we will expect policy autonomy 
concerning individual decisions or issues (operational autonomy) to be more extensive 
in agencies scoring high on professional quality values. Also, agencies with a strong 
customer and service culture will perceive themselves as having more autonomy and less 
control than other agencies (H7b).  
External  pressure  
A third set of factors describe the autonomy and control of agencies primarily as a 
response to external pressure (Olsen 1992). The importance of the environment may be 
of two kinds (Christensen and Lægreid 2001). In the first instance there may be an 
adaptation to internationally based norms and beliefs about how an agency should be 
run and steered simply because these have become the prevailing doctrine in the 
institutional environment. New Public Management, with its strong focus on 
privatization, disaggregation, and agency autonomy, has been taken for granted and 
become ideologically dominant. Thus, there will be pressure for all agencies to engage in 
similar practices. The hypothesis (H8) will be that there is generally a high degree of 
autonomy and low variation in autonomy between agencies. What will be reported, 
however, is not necessarily practice, but interpretations of practice (Sahlin-Andersson 
1996). 
In the second instance, autonomy may be adopted to solve widespread problems 
created by the technical environment, such as performance and economic competition 
and market pressure in a global economy. Agencies are said to become more 
autonomous because this improves credibility and reduces problems of political 
uncertainty (Gilardi 2004). Especially for agencies operating in the market it is important 
to prevent political executives interfering in their daily business in order to enhance free, 
fair, and equal competition in the market and thus promote economy and efficiency. 
Autonomous agencies are seen as a favorable organizational form because agencies can 
be insulated from immediate, partisan political pressure. Thus, the agency model is 
chosen because it is the most efficient organizational form. 
In this case a high level of agency autonomy will be the result not of ideological 
hegemony, but of the perceived technical efficiency of this model. Pollitt et al. (2004) 
have revealed that the way agencies are steered depends on whether they are embedded 
in a market or not. Agencies operating on a market need some kind of commercial 
independence and discretion to match their competitors and interference and steering 
from parent ministries in their daily businesses tend to undermine their position vis-a-
vis other market actors. The hypothesis (H9) is that agencies working in a market or a 
quasi-market situation will have more autonomy from the parent ministry than agencies 
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which have no competitors. We will expect this to be the case especially when it comes 
to autonomy concerning individual decisions or issues (operational autonomy). 
Blending the perspect ives  
The external pressure from the institutional environment or the technical environment 
may to some extent be handled instrumentally. Thus, governments and agencies may 
adopt new organizational forms to increase their legitimacy or to reduce the 
uncertainties produced by the market. The less one emphasizes the deterministic aspects 
of external pressure from the environment, the more this set of factors may be 
associated with a structural-instrumental approach. However, the degree of freedom in 
organizational design will probably be more limited by external pressure than by the 
structural features discussed previously. 
We will argue that environmental, cultural, and structural context constitute 
transformative preconditions and constraints that in a complex and dynamic way affect 
the trade-off between autonomy and control (Christensen and Lægreid 2001). Cultural 
factors can modify the effects of formal structure, but cultural factors can also support 
structural devolution and make the effects even stronger. In the same way, external 
forces by a competitive market may be enhanced or tempered by structural features or 
administrative culture and tradition (Christensen and Lægreid 2004a). A main 
presumption is that formal organizational structures constrain organizational behavior, 
but also that the autonomy and control of agencies cannot be traced to one single factor 
such as formal structure. The type of formal structure is normally a broad category, 
which gives some direction but also allows a great variety of actual behavior.  
Summing up, the complexity of the context matters, task-specific factors are 
important and the degree of perceived autonomy and control is the result of a blend of 
external pressure, path dependencies, and structural constraints (Olsen 1992, Pollitt et 
al. 2004). Instead of assuming that organizational forms determine the degree of 
autonomy or that autonomy is totally determined by external pressure or internal 
administrative culture, we will argue that we have to combine these features to 
understand the scope, level, and variation of autonomy and control. This will be done 
by focusing on the degree of freedom that exists within different organizational forms 
and in the great variety of situations arising both in administrative culture and in the 
environment. 
Data base and methodology 
In the formal structural arrangements of the Norwegian state apparatus the form of 
affiliation is a crucial organizational feature for classifying whether an organization is 
part of the civil service or not. At the national level the civil service is divided into quite 
small ministries with directorates/central agencies, other ordinary public administration 
bodies, agencies with extended authority, and government administrative enterprises, all 
outside the ministries but reporting to a ministry. Civil service organizations at the 
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regional or local level may report either directly to a ministry or through an organization 
at the national level. All civil service organizations are, legally speaking, government 
entities subject to ministerial directions and subordinated to ministerial control. In 
contrast to state-owned companies, civil service organizations are regulated through the 
state budget, the state collective wage agreement, the state pension scheme, the 
Freedom of Information Act, and the administrative law. Some agencies and all 
government administrative enterprises are given enhanced budgetary leeway (Lægreid et 
al. 2003). In short, the form of affiliation grants different sets of formal constraints or 
freedom of action in the interplay with general governmental regulative frameworks. In 
this respect, the level of agency autonomy and political steering and control, at least to a 
certain degree, formally follows as a consequence of form of affiliation.  
In Norway, agencies outside the ministries represent the largest share of the civil 
service. In 2003 only a small percentage of civil servants were employed by ministries 
(about 3,900). In comparison, about 120,000 civil servants (including those at the 
regional and local levels) were employed by directorates/central agencies, other ordinary 
public administration bodies, agencies with extended authority, and government 
administrative enterprises. This number decreased from 185,000 in 1990, mainly due to 
the transformation of some large agencies and administrative enterprises into state-
owned companies outside the civil service (e.g., Norwegian State Railways, the 
Norwegian Power Company, Telenor, the Norwegian Post, the airport administration 
and road construction.  
The data base used in this paper is a survey addressed to all organizations in the civil 
service outside the ministries in 2004—i. e., organizations that are part of the state as a 
legal entity and are reporting to one or more ministries. It excludes ministries, local 
government, state-owned companies and governmental foundations. The civil service 
organizations are divided into sub-forms of affiliation. As of 2004 there were 57 
directorates/central agencies, 125 other ordinary public administration bodies, 28 
agencies with extended authority, and 5 government administrative enterprises.  
The population of organizations consists of three different agency types: First, all single 
national civil service organizations without subordinate units, comprising 107 bodies 
(e.g., the Norwegian Competition Authority, the Directorate for Nature Management, 
and the Data Inspectorate). Second, integrated civil service organizations consisting of a 
national unit as well as subordinated regional or local branches (e.g., the Norwegian Tax 
Administration, Norwegian Customs and Excise, and the National Police Directorate). 
All of these 40 national units are included in the population, and they were asked to 
answer on behalf of the whole organization. Third, all single units in groups of similar 
civil service organizations in different geographical areas, reporting directly to one or 
more ministry (e.g., the County Governors, colleges etc.), comprising 68 bodies 
covering specific parts of the country. 
Given these criteria, the population adds up to 215 civil service organizations. One 
questionnaire was sent to each agency, and a central manager was asked to answer on 
behalf of the whole organization. The questionnaire was an adaptation of a similar 
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survey carried out in Belgium (Flanders) in 2002–2003 (Verhoest et al. 2003).2 It was 
rather comprehensive, covering organizational characteristics, autonomy dimensions, 
steering and control relationships, and organizational culture (Lægreid et al. 2004). A 
total of 150 organizations answered the survey, which constitutes a response rate of 70 
%. There are only small variations in the response rate according to sub-form of 
affiliation and type of agency and between different ministerial areas. For half of the 
ministerial areas the response rate was over 80 % and none was below 50 %. Thus our 
conclusion is that the respondents are quite representative for the population of 
Norwegian state agencies. 
The information on form of affiliation, type of agency, and agency age is based on 
the Norwegian State Administration Database, covering changes in the formal structure 
in state organizations from 1947 onwards (Lægreid et al. 2003). The information on the 
other independent variables and on all of the dependent variables is based on the 
questionnaire.  
The dependent variables we will use in this paper are different dimensions of 
autonomy and control, as perceived by the civil service organizations. In considering 
autonomy we will differentiate between personnel autonomy, financial autonomy, and 
policy autonomy. Policy autonomy will include to what degree the agency can formulate 
its own goals and objectives independently of the parent ministry. In addition to this 
measure of strategic policy autonomy we also will examine operational policy autonomy. 
One indication of this kind of autonomy is to what degree the agency can decide on 
policy instruments, such as use of resources and other input, to achieve their goals 
without involvement from the parent ministry. Another indication is to what degree the 
agency can decide on matters concerning task accomplishment without involvement 
from the ministry. 
The steering and control variables are different types of general rules in central 
government for financial management, personnel and salary arrangements, health, 
safety, and environmental regulations, and more specific rules regulating the rights of 
various ministries to instruct individual agencies. The regulations of international bodies 
like the EU and the WTO may also constrain agency autonomy. Furthermore, the 
parent ministry and the Ministry of Finance may generally steer and control the activities 
and practices of the agencies. 
To describe and explain the degree of and variation in perceived autonomy and 
control we will primarily use univariate frequencies, bivariate correlations of all relevant 
relationships (summed up by measures like Pearson’s r), and multivariate analysis of 
independent variables having significant bivariate correlations (summed up by 
standardized beta coefficients in linear regressions). While univariate frequencies of 
dependent variables include all categories, in the bivariate and multivariate analyses we 
use additive indexes and some variables which are dichotomized according to the most 
relevant categories in each case. 
 
                                                 
2 The questionnaire is part of the «Comparative Public Organization Data Base for Research and Analysis – Network» 
(COBRA). More information on the COBRA network is available on the Internet: 
http://www.publicmanagement-cobra.org/ 
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Empirical results 
The dependent  var iables:  autonomy and 
control  
The first questions we would like to cover are to what extent the agencies perceive 
themselves as having autonomy, and whether this autonomy is of a general character or 
differentiated between the various dimensions. We will distinguish between personnel 
autonomy, financial autonomy, and policy autonomy. For personnel autonomy and 
policy autonomy we will also distinguish between strategic autonomy (concerning 
general decisions/issues) and operational autonomy (concerning individual de-
cisions/issues).  
 
Personnel autonomy. There has been a general trend in Norway over the past 15 years 
to make the rather centralized and standardized salary and personnel system more 
flexible and decentralized. Agencies have gained more discretion both in personnel 
matters and in setting pay scales and salaries (Christensen and Lægreid 1998). 
Table 1 shows, first, that the agencies report a rather high level of personnel 
autonomy. The proportion stating that they have a lot of autonomy is considerably 
higher than those saying they have little or no autonomy. Second, the agencies 
differentiate between strategic personnel autonomy and operational personnel 
autonomy. Overall autonomy for agencies in personnel matters is greater in operational 
issues than in strategic issues. This is the case along all the five dimensions of personnel 
autonomy. Added to this, autonomy is greatest when it comes to recruitment and to 
evaluation of personnel. On such issues the agencies have quite a lot of autonomy both 
in formulating criteria and standards and in deciding individual cases. Autonomy is 
perceived to be lowest with regard to salaries and wage increases and concerning 
downsizing and dismissals.  
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Table 1. To what extent can the agency independently of the parent ministry or superior body make 
decisions on various personnel issues? Percentages. 
 To a large 
degree 
To some 
degree 
Little or no 
degree 
N=100% 
Strategic personnel matters: 
Level of salaries 
General criteria for promotion  
General criteria for evaluation  
General criteria for recruitment  
General criteria for downsizing 
 
35 
43 
65 
61 
31 
 
50 
45 
27 
32 
48 
 
15 
13 
8 
7 
22 
 
148 
148 
148 
148 
147 
Operational personnel matters: 
Wage increases for individual employees 
Promotion of individual employees 
Evaluation of individual employees 
Recruiting individual employees 
Dismissal of individual employees 
 
60 
65 
81 
88 
60 
 
23 
20 
17 
10 
25 
 
18 
15 
2 
2 
15 
 
146 
146 
147 
146 
146 
 
For the rest of the analysis we constructed two additive indexes, one for strategic 
personnel autonomy and one for operational personnel autonomy.3 The indexes range 
from 0 (not a large degree of autonomy in any dimension in Table 1) to 5 (a large degree 
of autonomy in all dimensions). For strategic personnel autonomy 19 % of the agencies 
reported a large degree of autonomy on all five dimensions and 25 % not a large degree 
of autonomy along any dimension. The corresponding percentages for operational 
personnel autonomy are 41 % and 9 %. 
 
Financial autonomy. Agencies may also have financial autonomy. Over the past 20 
years there has been a general tendency in Norway to change the administration of the 
state budget in the direction of giving agencies more discretion in how to use the 
allocated resources. It has become easier to move funds from one year to another and 
between investment, salaries, and general operations. In addition, it has become more 
common among agencies to charge fees for products and services (Rubecksen 2003). 
Table 2 reveals, first, that the agencies have almost no autonomy when it comes to 
making loans for investment. This has to do with the fact that they are included in the 
state budget, which generally means that their funding should come from the annual 
                                                 
3 For both indexes all intercorrelations are significant at the .01 level. Pearson’s r is between .77 and .30. The way the 
two indexes have been created is by counting occurrences of agencies reporting a large degree of personnel 
autonomy for each of the five different dimensions.  
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state budget so they are not allowed to take up loans independently. The extended 
authority and increased autonomy in financial matters have not been expanded to the 
area of making loans.  
Table 2. To what degree can the agency independently of the parent ministry or superior body make 
decisions on various financial issues? Percentages. 
 To a large 
degree 
To some 
degree 
To little or no 
degree 
N=100% 
Make loans for investment 
Set tariffs/prices for products and services 
Set fees, charges 
Conclude legal contracts/agreements with private 
sector actors 
2 
23 
13 
65 
1 
33 
28 
29 
97 
43 
59 
6 
146 
145 
143 
146 
 
By contrast, the second finding is that agencies have a high degree of autonomy when it 
comes to concluding legal contracts and agreements with partners and actors in the 
private sector. Many agencies also have some limited autonomy in setting tariffs, prices, 
fees, and charges for their products and services. Compared to personnel autonomy, 
however, financial autonomy is more restricted, apart from the opportunity to conclude 
legal contracts. 
For the rest of the analysis we use an additive index for financial autonomy.4 The 
index ranges from 0 (not a large degree of autonomy on any dimension in Table 2) to 4 
(a large degree of autonomy on all dimensions). 34 % of the agencies do not report a 
large degree of financial autonomy on any dimension; 45 % report a large degree of 
financial autonomy on one dimension, 9 % on two, 11 % on three, and only 1 % on all 
four dimensions.  
 
Policy autonomy. When it comes to policy autonomy we distinguish between strategic 
policy autonomy and operational policy autonomy. The former concerns the ability of 
the agency to set its own goals and objectives. We asked the agencies to what degree 
they were involved in setting the general goals for their agency. 20 % of the agencies 
reported that they set their goals alone, 45 % said that the goal were formulated by the 
agency in cooperation with the parent ministry, 27 % reported that the parent ministry 
set the goals in cooperation with the agency, and 8 % of the agencies said the goals were 
formulated by the parent ministry alone. This picture reveals that the goal formulation 
process to a large extent is a cooperative effort between the agency and the parent 
ministry, and that, as perceived by the agencies at least, it is more a bottom-up process 
than a top-down process. This finding confirms similar patterns revealed in a 
                                                 
4 The intercorrelations are significant at the .01 level and Pearson’s r is between .22 and .64 for all correlations except 
for the correlation between the ability to make loans for investment and to set tariffs/prices for products and 
services, which is .14 (sign. .09) and to enter contracts (Pearson’s r is .09, sign. .03). The index is constructed in the 
same way as for the indexes related to personnel autonomy, by counting occurrences of agencies reporting a large 
degree of financial autonomy with respect to the four different dimensions. 
AUTONOMY AND CONTROL IN  THE  NORWEGIAN  CIVI L  SERVICE:  … WORKING PAPER  4  -  2005  
 21 
comprehensive study including agency leaders as well as political and administrative 
executives in the ministries (Christensen and Lægreid 2002). Thus, the hierarchical 
element, according to which goals should be exogenous and externally decided by the 
parent ministry, is much weaker than assumed by the official practitioners’ model of 
Management by Objectives and Results. 
Operational policy autonomy is the degree of freedom that agencies have in making 
decisions about policy instruments and task accomplishment.  
As Table 3 reveals, the agencies generally have a high degree of autonomy in 
choosing specific operational means and measures in day-to-day activities. About half of 
the agencies report that they take such decisions with little involvement or restrictions 
from the parent ministry. The degree of autonomy concerning policy instruments is 
slightly lower, but also rather high.  
Table 3. Which of the following assertions gives the most precise description of your autonomy in 
choosing policy instruments and in task accomplishment? Percentages. 
 
 Policy Instruments: 
Choice of general policy 
instruments (use of resources, 
inputs) for achievement of goals 
and objectives for the agency 
Task accomplishment: 
Choice of concrete, 
operational means and 
measures (prioritizing of 
activities) for the agency 
The agency takes most decisions alone. The 
parent ministry is only partly involved and sets 
few restrictions 
The agency takes most decisions alone after 
consulting the parent ministry 
The agency takes most decisions alone in 
accordance with the constraints and restrictions 
set by the parent ministry 
The parent ministry takes most decisions itself 
after consulting the agency 
 
29 
10 
 
60 
 
2 
 
46 
5 
 
48 
 
1 
N=100% 146 146 
 
For the rest of the analysis we constructed an additive index for operational policy 
autonomy. The index ranges from 2 (agencies take most decisions alone and the parent 
ministry is only partly involved and sets few restrictions when choosing both policy 
instruments as well as when it comes to task accomplishment) to 0 (not agreeing with 
this assertion either for policy instruments or for task accomplishment).5 34 % of the 
agencies report a large degree of operational policy autonomy along both dimensions, 
19 % report a lot of autonomy along one dimension, and 47 % say they do not have 
much autonomy along any dimension. 
                                                 
5 The correlation (Pearson’s r) between the two variables that the index is based on is .57 (sign. .001). The index is 
constructed in the same way as for the other indexes, by counting occurrences of agencies reporting a large extent 
of operational policy autonomy with respect to the two dimensions (policy instruments and task accomplishment). 
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Steering and control. The relationship between superior bodies and the agencies is not 
only about autonomy. Steering and control represent the other side of the coin. This can 
take the form of various rules and regulations, like general rules for financial 
management; salary and personnel regulations; rules regulating safety, environmental, 
and health issues; and international rules, regulations, and standards issued by 
international organizations such as the EU or the WTO. Also the Ministry of Finance 
and the parent ministry may put specific constraints on the agencies. The parent 
ministry may have general rights of instruction on all issues, or there may be restrictions 
on its rights of instruction in specific cases.  
Table 4 reveals, first, that most of the agencies report that they are constrained by 
general financial management regulations, something which was also shown in a 
comprehensive study of political and administrative executives in the Norwegian 
ministries, agencies, and state-owned companies in 2001 (Christensen and Lægreid 
2002). In 1997 the Ministry of Finance introduced a new comprehensive set of 
regulations for financial management in central government based on principles of 
performance management, which was rather unpopular among the agencies. Some years 
later this critique resulted in revision and simplification of the finance management 
regulations, but still these rules and regulations seem to put strong constraints on many 
agencies. Second, we also see that, in spite of increased liberalization and 
decentralization of the rather centralized and standardized personnel and salary 
arrangements over the past 15 years, the agencies still report significant constraints from 
such rules and regulations. Here one should take into account the rather strong state 
employees’ unions in Norway, which have considerable influence on such issues 
(Roness 2001).  
Third, somewhat surprisingly in the light of the increased integration of the 
Norwegian central government into the EU (Jacobsson, Lægreid and Pedersen 2003), 
and also the increased importance of other international organizations as regulatory and 
standardization bodies, such international constraints seem to play a less important role 
than the general domestic regulations in the fields of finance, salaries, and personnel. 
Table 4 also shows that the control constraints from the parent ministry vary 
considerably between agencies, but also that the agencies generally report stronger 
constraints from their own parent ministry than from the Ministry of Finance. Here one 
should bear in mind that, following the reorganization of the state budget system in the 
mid-1990s, much of the financial allocation to the agencies was delegated from the 
Ministry of Finance to the parent ministries. 
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Table 4. Control constraints on agencies from various rules, regulations and actors. Percentages. 
 Very 
large 
Large To some 
degree 
Small Very 
small 
Do not 
know 
N=100% 
Financial management regulations 
 
Salary and personnel regulations 
 
Health, environmental, and safety 
regulations 
 
International regulations and 
standards (i.e. EU, WTO) 
 
Parent ministry 
 
Ministry of Finance 
 
18 
 
12 
 
 
7 
 
 
8 
 
8 
 
6 
 
32 
 
45 
 
 
28 
 
 
14 
 
26 
 
15 
 
37 
 
30 
 
 
28 
 
 
22 
 
43 
 
7 
 
11 
 
11 
 
 
23 
 
 
33 
 
16 
 
26 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
12 
 
 
19 
 
5 
 
10 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
3 
 
1 
 
6 
 
148 
 
148 
 
 
148 
 
 
147 
 
148 
 
145 
 
There are strong significant intercorrelations between these control dimensions. We will 
thus use an additive index for control constraints, ranging from 0 (very large constraints 
on none of the dimensions in Table 4) to 6 (very large constraints on all regulations and 
actors).6 73 % of the agencies do not report very large constraints from any of these 
rules, regulations, or actors. 
In addition, we will include a variable that reveals whether there are rules and 
regulations which restrict the parent ministry’s power to instruct the agency. 45 % 
report that there are such restrictions. These types of restrictions are normally relevant 
for certain areas of agency activities and may be enshrined in law, but in some cases they 
cover all activities. They can be case-specific, but also of a more general character. 
 
Interdependencies. Another interesting question is whether perceived autonomy along 
the different dimensions indicates some kind of cumulative pattern, whether there are 
certain clusters of autonomy, or whether there is a differentiated pattern. Table 6 shows 
that the dimensions are quite loosely coupled. There is not a cumulative pattern, 
indicating that if there is a high degree of autonomy along one dimension, there is not 
always a high degree of autonomy along other dimensions. There are, however, some 
clusters, so the pattern is not totally differentiated. Thus, there is a significant positive 
correlation between strategic personnel autonomy and operational personnel autonomy 
and also between operational personnel autonomy and financial autonomy. Interestingly 
enough, there are no significant negative correlations between the different autonomy 
dimensions. 
                                                 
6 The intercorrelations are significant at the .01 level and Pearson’s r is between .67 and .21 for all correlations. The 
index is constructed by counting the occurrences of agencies reporting to very strong control constraints according 
to the six different dimensions of control constraints. 
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Table 5. Intercorrelations between dependent variables. Pearson’s r. 
 
Operational 
personnel 
autonomy 
Financial 
Management 
autonomy 
Strategic policy 
autonomy 
Operational 
policy 
autonomy 
Strategic personnel autonomy ,45** ,15 -,07 ,11 
Operational personnel 
autonomy 
 
 ,32** ,05 ,11 
Financial management 
autonomy 
 
  ,05 ,14 
Strategic policy autonomy     ,05 
**: Significant at the 0.01 level; *: Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Summing up, this picture confirms that the autonomy dimensions vary, as revealed from 
other studies (Christensen 2001, Verhorst et al. 2004). This does not mean, however, 
that agencies score high along some dimensions and low on others. Instead, the general 
impression is of positive correlations between some autonomy dimensions and rather 
loose or indifferent correlations between others. 
Bivar iate  and mult ivar iate  analyses  
The next questions on which we focus are how the scores on the different independent 
variables, i.e. our indicators of structural, cultural, and environmental features, correlate 
with the autonomy and control variables. We first examine the bivariate relations 
between each set of variables and the different autonomy and control dimensions, and 
then do a multivariate analysis of the relative importance of the various variables for 
agency autonomy and control. 
Structural features. Are there any differences in perceived autonomy and control 
according to the structural features of the agencies? Table 6 reveals that, except for 
financial autonomy, form of affiliation has no significant effect on autonomy and 
control. This means that structural disaggregation makes a difference when it comes to 
perceived financial autonomy. Agencies with some form and degree of formal 
autonomy generally report a large degree of financial autonomy on more indicators than 
ordinary agencies. For personnel autonomy, policy autonomy, and control constraints, 
form of affiliation does not seem to be of any great significance. Thus, in general, H1 is 
not confirmed. 
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Table 6 Bivariate correlations between independent and dependent variables. Pearson’s r. 
 Strategic 
personnel 
autonomy 
Operational 
personnel 
autonomy 
Financial 
autonomy 
Strategic 
policy 
autonomy 
Opera-
tional policy 
autonomy 
Control 
con-
straints 
Constraints on 
instructions 
Structural 
variables: 
Form of affiliation 
Type of agency 
Primary tasks: 
-service providing 
 -regulation  
 
 
.01 
-.14 
 
-.21** 
.04 
 
 
.10 
.03 
 
-.03 
-.05 
 
 
.26** 
-.18* 
 
.27** 
-.24** 
 
 
.13 
-.08 
 
.00 
.03 
 
 
-.12 
-.23** 
 
.04 
-.10 
 
 
.14 
.09 
 
-.05 
.01 
 
 
.01 
.09 
 
.03 
.01 
Cultural  
variables: 
Agency age  
Agency size 
Mutual trust 
Professional culture 
Customer and 
service culture 
 
 
.14 
.04 
.06 
.07 
.14 
 
 
.11 
.38** 
-.06 
-.07 
.07 
 
 
-.05 
.07 
.03 
.05 
.02 
 
 
-.03 
-.04 
-.07 
-.14 
-.10 
 
 
.13 
-..06 
.08 
.17* 
.14 
 
 
-.01 
.13 
.21* 
.05 
-.06 
 
 
-.20* 
-.04 
-.06 
.01 
.02 
Environmental 
variables: 
Market competition 
 
 
 
-.18*. 
 
 
.04 
 
 
.26** 
 
 
.05 
 
 
.04 
 
 
.01 
 
 
.08 
**: Significant at the .01 level; *: Significant at the .05 level (2-tailed) 
Like the form of affiliation, type of agency makes a difference when it comes to 
financial autonomy, but this structural feature is also of importance for operational 
policy autonomy. Agencies specialized mainly according to geography normally have 
less strategic personnel autonomy, less financial autonomy, and also less operational 
policy autonomy than agencies without territorial branches. These correlations are the 
opposite of what our formulated hypothesis (H2) led us to expect. One possible 
explanation is that no agency only uses the principle of geography, since all agencies 
with a territorial base are also specialized according to purpose, process or clientele, 
being either directly subordinated a ministry or having a central agency between itself 
and the ministry. Thus the principles of specialization are combined, and in practice 
other principles are more important for understanding the degree of autonomy than the 
principle of geography. 
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When it comes to primary tasks, agencies with regulatory tasks or service providing 
or producing tasks do not in general perceive themselves to have more autonomy than 
agencies with other primary tasks. On the contrary, agencies with service providing or 
producing tasks have generally less strategic personnel autonomy than agencies with 
other tasks, but more financial autonomy. For regulatory agencies financial autonomy is 
generally low. Thus, when it comes to service providing or producing agencies, our 
stated hypothesis (H3) is only confirmed for financial autonomy. 
 
Cultural features. The general impression of Table 6 is that cultural features have relatively 
few significant effects on autonomy and control. Agency age is only significantly 
correlated with constraints on instructions from the parent ministry. Thus, in general, 
H4 is not confirmed. Agency size has a significant positive effect on operational 
personnel autonomy, meaning that large agencies generally have more autonomy in 
individual hiring, promotion, pay setting, and dismissals than smaller units. Overall, 
however, neither of the hypotheses on the importance of agency size (H5a, H5b) is 
confirmed. 
Mutual trust has a significant positive effect on the control constraints index, 
meaning that agencies perceiving a very high level of mutual trust between the agency 
and the parent ministry also report fewer constraints on many regulations and from 
central actors. For the other dimensions of autonomy and control, trust is of less 
relevance. Thus, in general, our stated hypothesis (H6) is not confirmed. This may be 
due to the generally high level of trust and little variation between agencies with regard 
to this cultural feature: most of the agencies report a very high or a high level of mutual 
trust between the agency and the ministry. 
Internal professional culture makes a difference when it comes to operational policy 
autonomy. Agencies with very good professional quality have more operational policy 
autonomy than other agencies. Thus, H7a is confirmed for the most relevant case, but 
not otherwise. With regard to the importance of customer and service culture, the stated 
hypothesis (H7b) is not confirmed for any dimension of autonomy and control.  
 
Environmental features. The hypothesis on the degree and variation of autonomy and 
control (H8) is a bit difficult to evaluate. As shown in Tables1 to 4, for some of the 
chosen dimensions most agencies score high on autonomy and low on steering and 
control. As mentioned above (cf. Table 6), there are also some significant correlations 
between organizational features and autonomy and control, but the main picture is little 
variation between agency forms. However, even if a null hypothesis on no or low 
variation was to be confirmed, it would not tell us much about what features may affect 
agency autonomy and control. The fact that agency age seems to be of little relevance 
may indicate that internal agency-specific norms established over time are less important 
than the dominant external administrative doctrines of our time coming from the NPM-
movement, which certifies agency autonomy as a «best practice.» Another interpretation 
may be that our indicators on agency culture are not able to reveal the specific historical 
legacy that characterizes the various Norwegian agencies. 
AUTONOMY AND CONTROL IN  THE  NORWEGIAN  CIVI L  SERVICE:  … WORKING PAPER  4  -  2005  
 27 
With regard to the more specific hypothesis on the importance of environmental 
features, agencies which operate in a market or in a quasi-market situation facing 
competition have less strategic personnel autonomy than other agencies. They do, 
however, have greater financial autonomy. In general, the stated hypothesis (H9) is not 
confirmed.  
Mult ivar iate  analys is  
We now turn to the question of the relative explanatory power of the different 
independent variables on agency autonomy and control.7 The multivariate analyses 
generally confirm the main pattern revealed in the bivariate analyses. One general 
finding from the multivariate analysis, summed up in Table 7, is that the independent 
variables explain only a small part of the variation in the dependent variables. After 
controlling for other variables there are few significant correlations. The structural-
instrumental perspective has some explanatory power for financial autonomy and 
operational policy autonomy. National agencies with no regional or local branches 
normally have more financial autonomy and operational policy autonomy than other 
agencies. This is somewhat surprising given our initial hypothesis (H2). Form of 
affiliation does not, however, have any significant effect on agency autonomy and 
control (H1). This is surprising, given the importance that this variable is assigned in 
administrative reforms and recent regulatory reforms.  
When it comes to cultural variables, agency age has a significant effect on the scope 
of ministries to instruct the agencies, and agency size also makes a difference for 
operational personnel autonomy. Also the mutual trust between agency and ministry has 
a significant effect when it comes to constraints on the agencies imposed by general 
regulations, the parent ministry, or the Ministry of Finance. However, other cultural 
features, like the extent of professional culture does not seem to influence perceived 
autonomy and control to any significant extent. Market competition has not a significant 
effect when controlling for structural and cultural features.  
                                                 
7 Only variables with significant bivariate correlations are included in the analysis.  
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Table 7. Summary of regression equations by structural, cultural and environmental features affecting 
agency autonomy and control. Standardized Beta coefficients. Linear regressions. 
 Strategic 
personnel 
autonomy 
Operational 
personnel 
autonomy 
Financial 
autonomy 
Operational 
policy 
autonomy 
Control 
con-
straints 
Constraints on 
instructions 
Structural variables: 
Form of affiliation 
Type of agency 
Primary task: 
-service provision 
-regulation 
 
- 
- 
 
-.15 
- 
 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
 
.14 
-.15* 
 
.11 
-.09 
 
- 
-..20** 
 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
Cultural variables: 
Agency age  
Agency size 
Mutual trust 
Professional culture 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
- 
.38** 
- 
- 
 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
- 
- 
- 
.14 
 
 
- 
. 
.21* 
- 
 
 
-.20** 
- 
- 
- 
 
Environmental variables: 
Market competition 
 
 
-.11 
 
- 
 
 
.12 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
Multiple R 
R2 
Adjusted R2 
F statistics 
Significance of F 
.23 
.05 
.04 
3.968 
.021 
.38 
.14 
.14 
2.403 
.000 
.38 
.14 
.11 
4.711 
.001 
.26 
.07 
.05 
5.043 
.008 
.21 
.04 
.04 
6.523 
.012 
.20 
.04 
.03 
5.844 
.017 
**: Significant at the .01-level; *: Significant at the .05-level (2-tailed). -: not included in the analysis 
Summing up, the explanatory power of our perspectives is relatively weak, but we find 
some significant effects from structural and cultural variables. Autonomy seems to be a 
multi-dimensional concept, and there is no one-factor explanation for variation in 
agency autonomy. 
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Discussion 
In this section we will discuss our findings in relation to other studies on autonomy and 
control in public-sector agencies and companies. Studies of different forms of affiliation 
indicate that government control of state-owned companies is seen as overly formal and 
relatively passive, and also that the sub-forms have many similar features, with little 
differentiation between company types. There is no close match between the legal status 
and operational practice of each sub-form (Grønlie 2001, Statskonsult 1998). A 
plausible conclusion from the existing studies is that while organizational form matters, 
it does not closely determine the pattern of autonomy and control. Even if the form of 
affiliation allows significant leeway for a trade-off between different objectives and 
values, it is fair to say that, generally speaking, the possibilities for political control 
decrease with increasing structural disaggregation from the ministries (Wik 2002). The 
extent of agency contact with ministries drops when they are converted from 
organizational forms that are close to the ministries to forms that are further away from 
them, and less weight is given to signals from the political executive (Egeberg 1989). 
The hypothesis is that structural devolution weakens the instruments of control and 
increases the autonomy of independent agencies. Surveys of the Norwegian civil service 
have shown that civil servants in central agencies outside the ministries see political 
signals and considerations as significantly less important for decision-making than civil 
servants inside the ministries (Christensen and Egeberg 1997, Christensen and Lægreid 
1998), and structural devolution tends to reduce the steering power of the political 
executive (Christensen and Lægreid 2005b).  
Our findings in this paper confirm that agencies generally have large autonomy, but 
also that organizational forms represent rather rough and broad categories that allow 
variations in actual autonomy and control. This means that variations within the same 
organizational form might be larger than variations between different forms (Verhoest 
et al. 2004, Wik 2002). When assessing these findings one also has to take into account 
the effects of sampling on the dependent variable (Peters 2004, Geddes 2003). By 
focusing on organizations that are meant to be relatively autonomous we may not be 
able to understand whether the degree of autonomy observed is atypical or typical for all 
state organizations. Including a fuller range of state organizations at the national level 
might have given a better understanding of the consequences of organizational form. 
This might especially have been the case if we had not only studied sub-forms within 
the agency model but also included ministries and state-owned companies. Our findings 
seem to indicate that the sub-form of affiliation is of less importance than whether the 
agency has regional/local branches or not. 
The effects of form of affiliation are also modified by contextual factors, in Norway 
as well as in other countries. There are trade-offs between autonomy and control 
between countries, but also between and within different forms of affiliation within the 
same country (Wik 2002). Even in the same agency or state organization there may be 
significant variation over time, across different policy areas or according to 
performance, results, and political situation (Grønlie 2001). This implies that structure 
matters, but also that each organizational form is quite broad, allowing for variation in 
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practice. One lesson is that one should be careful about regarding form of affiliation and 
other structural features as determining autonomy and steering relations and instead 
perceive them as a repertoire of agency forms hosting potential actions and rules that 
can be activated under different contextual circumstances. This being said, this study has 
also revealed that agencies generally have great autonomy especially when it comes to 
operational autonomy, indicating that the agency model, as expected from a structural-
instrumental approach, gives a lot of leeway and discretion to the agencies included. 
One important contextual feature is the administrative culture and tradition in which 
the agencies operate. Such norms can either be agency-specific, representing vertical 
depth, or more general covering the whole of central government, representing 
horizontal width (Krasner 1988). In this paper we have primarily tried to reveal the first 
type of administrative culture. Our findings are that some of our indicators have some 
effects on autonomy and steering relations, but they are not particularly strong. 
Nevertheless, broader and more general administrative norms that do not differentiate 
to any strong degree between agencies may also have an effect. 
One comprehensive comparative study of agencies in the fields of prisons, 
meteorology, forestry, and social security in four EU countries concludes that there is 
high variability in agencies and volatility in agency status and boundaries, that the official 
practitioner’s ideal model is rare in reality, that there is extensive national path 
dependency, that there is great variation in activities according to the agency’s primary 
tasks, but also according to how embedded they are in international networks and 
markets, that performance indicators are widespread but seldom used to clarify major 
trade-offs, and that full-scale performance management is rare (Pollitt et al. 2004). Our 
study indicates that primary tasks may make a difference, even if our measures do not 
have a great impact and are not significant when controlling for other features. Agencies 
that are primarily concerned with service providing or producing tasks tend to have 
more autonomy along some dimensions than agencies involved in other types of tasks. 
External pressure, represented by the degree of competition and the extent to which 
international markets, rules, and regulations are involved, also makes a difference when 
it comes to autonomy and steering of agencies (Pollitt et al. 2004). In our case, market 
competition seems to have some influence on strategic personnel autonomy, but not on 
other autonomy dimensions, and the effects are not significant when controlling for 
structural and cultural factors.  
Summing up, the lesson is that context matters, and that there is no best way of 
governing regulatory agencies. Neither the organizational structure, nor the daily 
practical work, nor the steering of agencies is standardized. The structural-instrumental 
perspective can provide some insights into the processes of autonomization and 
control, but less than expected by reform agents or by other believers in the importance 
of formal structure. Agency practice is more diverse and context-dependent than the 
official model implies. Formal structure cannot be seen in isolation and as a narrow 
internal feature of organizations but must be extended to include task structure and the 
historical-institutional context and external networks and situations in which an agency 
is involved. A main observation is that one cannot easily infer from regulatory reform 
programs and formal agency structure how autonomy and control will be exercised in 
practice. Agency status in itself is an uncertain predictor of steering relationships (Pollitt 
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et al. 2004), especially when it comes to variations between different sub-forms of 
agencies. The legal status and formal powers of the agencies represent broad categories 
that allow for huge variations in actual behavior. There are great variations in how the 
rules for control, instructions, and appeals are formulated for different agencies and 
how they are practised (Christensen and Lægreid 2004b). We have to go beyond the 
legal status and formal powers of the regulatory agencies and examine the ‘living’ 
organizations to understand how agency autonomy is exercised in practice (Pollitt et al. 
2004).  
Conclusion 
In this paper we have shown, first, that the agencies have quite a lot of autonomy. The 
general pattern is that the trade-off between autonomy and control tends to tip in favor 
of autonomy. There are, however, significant variations in the degree of autonomy along 
different dimensions. There is generally higher autonomy in personnel matters than in 
financial matters, but the agencies also report a relatively high degree of autonomy with 
regard to policy. Furthermore, more autonomy is perceived in operational matters than 
in more strategic matters. However, this autonomy is not absolute but is constrained to 
a relatively large degree by general rules, regulations, and procedures in the fields of 
finance, salaries, and personnel. This general picture is important and reveals that 
agencies have a scope and degree of autonomy which is in accordance with the general 
presumptions from a structural-instrumental approach that an agency model will 
enhance autonomy. 
Second, agency autonomy is not of a general nature. The different dimensions of 
autonomy do not represent a cumulative pattern. Some autonomy dimensions represent 
a cluster and supplement one another, while others are rather loosely coupled. However, 
few indicators are negative correlated, meaning that a high score on one autonomy 
dimension does not go together with a low score on others. 
Third, we were not able to explain much of the variance in the dependent variables, 
i.e. perceived agency autonomy and control. The formulated hypotheses based on the 
selected variables derived from the structural-instrumental, the cultural-institutional, and 
the environmental approach generally do not get strong support in the empirical 
analyses. Thus, the answer to the question posed in the title of our paper «Does agency 
form matter?» must be «not very much»; this goes for cultural and environmental 
features as well. We have, however, mainly studied variations between sub-forms of 
agencies and the effect of structural forms may be different if we had distinguished 
between agencies and other main forms of affiliation for state organizations. 
Fourth, that said, there are some significant relationships related to variables derived 
from all three perspectives. From a structural-instrumental perspective, type of agency 
and also primary tasks make a difference for some autonomy and control dimensions. 
Seen from a cultural-institutional perspective, agency size, agency age, and also mutual 
trust have some explanatory power. Market competition seems to affect the degree of 
strategic personnel autonomy and financial autonomy, but is weakened when controlled 
for other features. 
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Thus, a lesson from this study is that there is no one-factor explanation for variations 
in agency autonomy and control. There is no single best theory which can explain 
agency activity in all situations and everywhere (Pollitt 2004). One has to look for 
explanatory factors among structural features, among cultural variables, and in the 
environment. Instead of deriving explanations based on one dominant logic, the 
challenge is to develop more complex propositions about how agencies work in 
practice. Another lesson is that there is a need to look for other variables derived from 
these perspectives, as well as from other approaches to gain a better understanding of 
the variation in agency autonomy and control. 
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Appendix  
Independent  var iables   
Form of affiliation 
In the Norwegian State Administration Database we distinguish between four sub-
forms of affiliation for civil service organizations outside the ministries: a) 
directorates/central agencies, b) other public administration bodies, c) agencies with 
extended authority, and d) government administrative enterprises (cf. Lægreid et al. 
2003). The first two types are also often called ordinary civil service organizations (or 
ordinary agencies), and are most closely linked to the ministries and subjected to general 
governmental regulative frameworks and regulations encompassing virtually all sides of 
their activity. Government administrative enterprises represent the opposite side of the 
continuum, primarily used for state organizations maintaining governmental business 
management, and are as such given wide financial latitude. A civil service organization 
with extended authority is a sub-form where the organizations formally have been 
granted some professional and financial leeway in relation to political steering/control 
and regulative frameworks. This sub-form is somewhere in between ordinary civil 
service organizations and government administrative enterprises.  
Due to the relatively low number of agencies with extended authority, and 
particularly government administrative enterprises, we will only distinguish between 
ordinary agencies and other agencies 
Table A1: Form of affiliation. Percentage.  
1. Other agencies 15 
0. Ordinary agencies 85 
N=100 % 150 
 
Type of agency 
We distinguish between three types of agency with regard to their territorial coverage: a) 
National agencies have no subordinate units, and form the only state organization of its 
kind in the country; b) Integrated agencies have a central unit and one or more subordinate 
units located in different geographical areas; c) Regional agencies are units covering a 
specific territorial area, reporting directly to one or more ministry. The data on type of 
agency is also extracted from the Norwegian State Administration Database. 
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Table A2: Type of agency. Percentage. 
1.National agency 51 
2. Integrated agency 19 
3. Regional agency 30 
N=100 % 150 
 
Primary task 
In the survey, questions were formulated in order to gather information on both 
primary (main) and secondary (additional) tasks of various kinds that an organization 
can attend to. We used five categories for tasks according to the possible engagement in 
the following: a) regulation and scrutiny, b) other kinds of exercising authority, c) 
general public services, d) business and industrial services, and e) policy formulation. 
Regulation and scrutiny was singled out as a separate category from other kinds of 
exercising authority, due to the specific and circumscribed nature of these tasks. For 
service provision and production, a distinction was made between tasks which primarily are 
carried out on a non-profit basis (general public services) and those who are on some 
form of a market (business and industrial services). The category of policy formulation 
includes policy shaping as well as policy formulation. 
In total, 33 answered that their primary task was regulation and scrutiny, 37 had 
other kinds of exercising authority, 69 had general public services, 7 had business and 
industrial services, and 4 had policy formulation. Due partly to the actual number of 
agencies in each category, and partly to the main interest in this paper, we distinguish 
between regulation and scrutiny, other kinds of exercising public authority/policy 
formulation, and service provision and production.  
Table A3: Primary task in agencies. Percentage. 
Regulation and scrutiny 23 
Other kinds of exercising public authority (and policy 
formulation)  
27 
Service provision and production 50 
N=100 % 150 
 
This variable is also used in two dichotomous variants: 
a) 1: regulation and scrutiny, 0: other tasks; 
b) 1: service provision and production, 0: other tasks 
 
Agency age 
The data on agency age has been extracted from the Norwegian State Administration 
Database, which provides detailed information on year of establishment. In this paper 
we use a dichotomy: agencies established before 1990, and agencies established in 1990 
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or later. The cut is partly based on the gradually greater scope and intensity of the NMP 
movement from 1990 onwards (Lægreid et al. 2003). 
 Table A4: Agency age. Percentage. 
1. Established before 1990  61  
0. Established 1990 or later  39 
N=100 % 150 
 
Agency size 
In the survey, the question of agency size used a predetermined set of categories for the 
number of employees (including subordinate branches): a) under 20, b) 20–49, c) 50–
199, d) 200–499, and e) 500 and over. In this paper we use three categories, as shown in 
Table A5. 
 
Table A5: Agency size. Percentage. 
3. 200 employees and more 40 
2. 50–199 employees 34 
1. Less than 50 employees  26 
N=100 % 147 
 
Mutual trust 
In the survey we asked for the extent of mutual trust between the agency and the parent 
ministry. The question originally gave the respondents the opportunity of choosing 
between five different categories: a) very high mutual trust, b) rather high mutual trust, 
c) high and low mutual trust, d) rather low mutual trust, e) very low mutual trust. Less 
than 8 % reported having a level on trust in category c) or lower, while a majority 
reported a very high level. Thus, in this paper we have used a dichotomy: very high 
mutual trust vs. rather high mutual trust or lower.  
Table A6: Mutual trust between agency and parent ministry as seen from the agency. Percentage. 
1. Very high mutual trust  53 
0. Rather high mutual trust or lower 47 
N=100 % 146 
 
Administrative culture 
One set of questions in the survey aimed at assessing different aspects of the prevailing 
administrative culture in the agency: «Assess the agency as it exists today. How well is 
(each of the following 16 aspects) attended to in the agency? Try to see the agency at 
WORKING PAPER  4  -  2005 AUTONOMY AND CONTROL IN  THE  NORWEGIAN  CIVI L  SERVICE:  … 
38 
distance.» For each aspect there was a scale: very bad, bad, average, good, and very 
good.  
In this paper we have selected two aspects as indicators of administrative culture: 
professional quality, and customer and service culture. Only a small part of the agencies 
gave an assessment below average for professional quality (1 %) and customer and 
service culture (8 %). A large majority assessed professional quality very good (35 %) or 
good (52 %), while the score on customer and service culture was a bit lower (15% very 
good and 52 % good). For both aspects we use a dichotomy, but the cut is different to 
avoid skewed distributions.  
Table A7: Assessment of professional quality in the agency. Percentage. 
1. Very good 35 
0. Good or less 65 
N=100 % 145 
Table A8: Assessment of customer and service culture in the agency .Percentage. 
1. Very good or good 67 
0. Average or less 33 
N=100 % 145 
 
Market competition 
Several questions were related to the extent of competition perceived by the agencies. 
First: «Taking the primary task of the organization as the point of departure – are there 
any other organizations carrying out the same or similar tasks and/or services within 
your field of work?» Here, 44 % of all agencies answered yes. They were posed a follow-
up-question: «If yes, is the agency in a market or a quasi-market characterized by 
competition?» Some of them (36 %) answered no, while the majority answered yes to 
some extent (43 %) or to a large extent (22 %). Here, we only distinguish between 
whether the agencies are in a market or a quasi-market characterized by competition or 
not. 
 Table A9: Is the agency in a market or a quasi- market characterized by competition? Percentage. 
1. Yes 30 
0. No 70 
N=100 % 150 
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